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Abstract Since the publication of Olson’s (1965) The Logic of Collective Action, the
exploitation hypothesis, in which the rich shoulder the provision burden of public goods for
the poor, has held sway despite empirical exceptions. To address such exceptions, we
establish two alternative exploitation hypotheses based on contributors’ asymmetric pref-
erences or on their productivity differences regarding the public good. The classic hypothesis
and its two variants are proven in a novel fashion. For asymmetric preferences, we also
establish the exploitation hypothesis for the joint products model with private and public co-
benefits. Our theoretical insights are then illustrated by some empirical examples from the
field of international public goods, such as military defense and cross-border pollution.
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1 Introduction
Beginning with Olson (1965), the ‘‘exploitation hypothesis’’ has been of recurrent interest
in the theory of public goods (see, e.g., Boadway and Hayashi 1999; Cornes and Sandler
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that, in a Nash equilibrium of voluntary public good provision, the rich (better endowed)
agents make larger contributions to the public good than the poor agents so that the rich
agents, in a certain sense, are ‘‘exploited’’ in the strategic context of the contribution game.
However, Sandler (2015, pp. 206–209) remarked that the hypothesis can be expected to
hold only under specific circumstances, i.e., if the agents behave according to the strategic
Nash assumption and possess identical preferences. While maintaining the Nash
assumption, we show that besides the original ‘‘exploitation of the rich by the poor’’ other
kinds of ‘‘exploitation’’ are possible: i.e., of the contributors with a high preference for the
public good by those with a low preference; of the contributors with high private co-
benefits from their public good contributions by those with low private co-benefits; and of
the contributors with greater productivity in providing the public good by those with lower
productivity. Our expanded analysis of exploitation provides a more complete picture of
the determinants of burden sharing with respect to voluntary public good provision. Even
though differences in preferences (see Andreoni 1988) or public good productivities (see
Buchholz and Konrad 1994; Ihori 1996) have been considered in the literature, these
approaches have not been associated explicitly with Olson’s exploitation hypothesis.
After describing the framework of the analysis in Sect. 2, we consider the three variants
of the exploitation maxim under quite general assumptions in Sect. 3. In particular, we
provide a short novel proof of the classical exploitation hypothesis and its two variants. In
Sect. 4, we illustrate the three versions of the exploitation hypothesis through examples
based on Cobb–Douglas preferences and, in particular, show how the underlying mecha-
nisms may oppose each other. In Sect. 5, we conclude by suggesting some empirical
applications of our theoretical results.
2 The framework
There are n agents, i = 1, …, n, who are characterized by their initial private good
endowments, wi, and their utility functions, ui(xi, G), where xi denotes agent i’s level of
private consumption and G indicates public good supply. Each utility function is assumed
to have the standard properties, i.e., it is twice continuously differentiable, quasi-concave,
and strictly monotonically increasing in both variables. Moreover, both goods are assumed
to be non-inferior for all agents. Agents may also have different constant productivities ai
(=individual marginal rates of transformation, mrti) in providing the public good. These
productivities indicate how many units of the public good agent i generates if she spends
one unit of the private good on the public good. The reciprocal of the productivity
parameter ai then represents agent i’s per unit cost of producing the public good.
Given the utility functions, ui(xi, G), and public good productivities, ai, the determi-
nation of the outcome of voluntary public good provision will essentially be based on the
(income) expansion paths, ei(G, ai), of the agents, i = 1, …, n. In xi-G space, agent i’s
expansion path connects all points (xi, G) at which agent i’s marginal rate of substitution
mrsi between the private and the public good is equal to ai; i.e., ai ¼ uixðxi ;GÞuiGðxi;GÞ holds, where
uix ¼ ouioxi and uiG ¼ ouioG denote the two partial derivatives of the utility function. Along such
an expansion path, agent i’s indifference curve has slope -ai. Non-inferiority of both
goods implies that the expansion paths ei(G, ai) are well-defined and strictly monotonically
increasing functions of G. In order to avoid the tedious treatment of subcases, we assume
that ei(0, ai) = 0 and limG??ei(G, ai) = ?.
104 Public Choice (2016) 168:103–114
123
For a further explanation of the expansion path concept, we note that agent i standing
alone and facing pi = 1/ai as the public good price would, as a price-taker, choose public
good supply G and private consumption xi = ei(G, ai) if i’s income were
~wi ¼ eiðG; aiÞ þ piG. In the framework of voluntary public good provision, agent i like-
wise would attain maximum utility at the same point (xi, G) = [ei(G, ai), G] when the
other agents contribute ~Gi ¼ G ai wi  eiðG; aiÞ½  in total to the public good and
~GiG or, equivalently, ei(G, ai) B wi holds (see Fig. 1). If, instead, ~Gi[G (or,
equivalently, ei(G, ai)[wi), agent i would want to make a negative contribution to the
public good, which, however, is not possible. Consequently, agent i attains maximum
utility at a corner solution at which her public good contribution is zero.
Let Giðwi; aiÞ be the level of public good supply at which the value of the expansion
path, ei(G, ai), corresponds to agent i’s initial endowment wi, i.e., ei Giðwi; aiÞ; ai½  ¼ wi
holds (see Fig. 1). From our assumptions and the intermediate value theorem, it follows
that Giðwi; aiÞ exists, and the monotonicity of the expansion path implies that it is unique.
Given initial endowment wi, utility functions, ui(xi, G), and productivity parameters, ai,
it is well-known that, under the assumptions imposed above, the Nash equilibrium (NE)
[denoted by ðx^1; . . .; x^n; G^Þ] of voluntary public good provision exists and is unique
(Bergstrom et al. 1986; Cornes and Sandler 1996; Cornes and Hartley 2007; Fraser 1992).
This NE, in which no agent can make a negative public good contribution, is characterized
by the following properties.
1. The feasibility constraint G^ ¼P
n
i¼1
aiz^i is satisfied, where z^i ¼ wi  x^i 0 is agent i’s
public good contribution.
2. The equilibrium position of each contributing agent i, i.e., for whom z^i[ 0 holds, lies
on i’s expansion path ei(G, ai), i.e., x^i ¼ eiðG^; aiÞ.
3. Agent i is a contributor if and only if G^\ Giðwi; aiÞ (Andreoni 1988; Andreoni and
McGuire 1993).
We now make use of these properties to present three different versions of the
exploitation hypothesis.
Fig. 1 Expansion path
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3 Three versions of the exploitation hypothesis
The three versions are obtained by assuming that the agents or contributors differ only with
respect to endowment levels, or preferences, or productivities, while they are homogenous
in terms of the other two properties.
Case 1 All agents have the same utility function, u(xi, G), and the same productivity
parameter, a, but have different income levels, wi.
The relevant expansion path, which is then common to all agents, is denoted by e(G, a).
Without loss of generality, we assume w1     wn. The monotonicity of e(G, a) thus
gives G1ðw1; aÞ     Gnðwn; aÞ. In Fig. 2, we, specifically, consider two agents, j and k,
with j\ k, for whom Gkðwk; aÞ[ Gjðwj; aÞ[ G^ holds so that both are contributors to the
public good (see Fig. 2).
From property (3), it follows that, at the NE, there is some m* C 1 where the group of
contributors consists of all rich agents for whom i C m*, whereas the group of noncon-
tributors consists of poorer agents for whom i\m*. Furthermore, property (2) implies
that, at the NE, all contributors have the same private consumption x^ ¼ eðG^; aÞ. Therefore,
at the NE, the absolute levels of public good contributions of the contributing agents,
z^i ¼ wi  x^, vary positively with income wi. This also is seen on the horizontal axis of
Fig. 2. The same holds true for the relative contribution levels z^i
wi
¼ 1  x^
wi
, which estab-
lishes Olson’s conventional exploitation maxim. Obviously, at the NE, all contributing
agents attain the same utility, uðx^; G^Þ; whereas non-contributors attain a smaller utility,
uðwi; G^Þ; ranked by income.
Case 2 All agents have the same income, w, and the same public good productivity, a,
but possess different utility functions, ui(xi, G).
In particular, we assume that agents can be ordered according to their marginal will-
ingness to pay for the public good. At each (x, G), we have mrsj ¼ ujxðx;GÞujGðx;GÞ 
ukxðx;GÞ
ukGðx;GÞ ¼ mrsk
if j, k 2 {1, …, n} with j\ k. The indifference curves of an agent with a lower rank j are
thus everywhere steeper than the indifference curves of an agent with a higher rank k, so
that agent k has a greater relative preference for the public good than that of agent j. Then,
convexity of indifference curves implies that ej(G, a) C ek(G, a) for any G if j\ k and
















Fig. 2 Classical income-based
exploitation hypothesis
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Property (3) shows that there is a m* C 1 for which only agents i C m* contribute to the
public good, while agents with less interest in the public good than agent m* contribute
nothing at the NE. For contributing agents j and k, we have, as depicted in Fig. 3, that
x^j ¼ ejðG^; aÞ ekðG^; aÞ ¼ x^k and hence z^j ¼ w x^jw x^k ¼ z^k if j\ k. This shows
that, ceteris paribus, agents with the greater preference for the public good spend more on it
at the NE in absolute and, as income w is the same for all agents here, also in relative
terms.
In particular, different preference intensities for the public good may be caused by
private co-benefits from individual public good contributions (see, e.g., Cornes and Sandler
1994), which may either stem from some warm-glow feeling of contributing to a chari-
table organization (see Andreoni 1990) or from the reduction in locally damaging pollu-
tants of contributing to a global public good (carbon dioxide mitigation) (see, e.g., Pittel
and Ru¨bbelke 2008). For this application of our analysis to impure public good models, we
assume that all agents have the same ‘‘basic’’ utility function, v(xi, G), with standard
properties and, as above, the same initial endowment, w. The ancillary benefits of their
individual public good contributions, however, may be of different strength. Specifically,
the private co-benefit that flows from agent i’s public good contribution zi = wi - xi is
measured by bih(zi), where h(zi) is a differentiable, strictly monotonically increasing and
concave function of zi and bi C 0 is an agent-specific scalar.
Given these assumptions for any agent, i = 1, …, n, we then construct an auxiliary
utility function, ui(xi, G) = v(xi, G) ? bih(wi - xi), defined for all xi 2 [0, wi) and G C 0.
We assume that ui(xi, G) is quasi-concave and that both the private and the public good are
non-inferior with respect to (w.r.t.) this utility function, which ensures existence and
uniqueness of an NE (see Kotchen 2007). Given ui(xi, G), the marginal rate of substitution





(wi - xi)[ 0, this mrsi is falling at any (xi, G) if bi is increased, so that a greater value of
bi indicates a stronger preference for the public good according to the general definition
above. If we assume that b1     bn, it follows from our previous reasoning that agent
k will contribute more to the public good than agent j when k[ j in the ensuing NE. In this
sense, agents that have higher private co-benefits from their public good contributions are
exploited by agents with lower private co-benefits.
Case 3 All agents have the same income, w, and the same utility function, u(xi, G), but
















Fig. 3 Exploitation based on
taste differences
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We assume that agents are ranked according to their productivities, i.e., a1      an.
Then, we have for the expansion paths originating from the common utility function that
e(G, aj) C e(G, ak) holds at each G if j\ k and, thus, G1ðw; a1Þ     Gnðw; anÞ. This
can be depicted in a diagram that is completely analogous to Fig. 3.
By the same argument as in cases 1 and 2 above, it now follows that, at the NE, agents
with a greater public good productivity, ceteris paribus, contribute more to the public good
than agents with a lower productivity. When agents j and k make positive contributions to
the public good, we have z^j ¼ w eðG^; ajÞw eðG^; akÞ ¼ z^k.
For Case 3, all non-contributors’ utility, uðw; G^Þ, is the same at the NE. Contributors’
utility, uðx^i; G^Þ, is smaller, the greater their public good productivity. In relationship to
Olson’s exploitation hypothesis, this reflects the ‘‘curse of being more productive’’ in
voluntary public good provision, which—in a different context and without direct relation to
Olson’s maxim—has also been observed by Buchholz and Konrad (1994) and Ihori (1996).
4 Cobb–Douglas examples
4.1 Illustration of the three cases
For an illustration of our general results, we assume that there are n = 3 agents. Agent i
possesses Cobb–Douglas preferences, uiðxi;GÞ ¼ xiGai , and, as above, has initial endow-
ment wi and public good productivity ai. From mrsi ¼ uixðxi;GÞuiGðxi;GÞ ¼ G
ai
aixiGai1
¼ ai, we get
eiðG; aiÞ ¼ xi ¼ Gaiai as the formula for the expansion paths of three agents, i = 1, 2, 3. The
condition that ei Giðwi; aiÞ; ai½  ¼ wi then yields Giðwi; aiÞ ¼ aiaiwi for i = 1, 2, 3. The
mrsi declines when the preference parameter ai increases, so that—according to the defi-
nition given above—a larger ai indicates a stronger preference for the public good.
For this specific configuration, we provide examples for each of the three cases, pre-
sented in the earlier general setting.
Case 1 ai = ai = 1 for i = 1, 2, 3 and w1 = 1, w2 = 2, and w3 = 3; i.e., the otherwise
equal agents are ranked w.r.t. their income levels.
Under these assumptions, the NE is given by x^1 ¼ 1 and x^2 ¼ x^3 ¼ G^ ¼ 53, so that agents
2 and 3 are contributors to the public good, while agent 1 is a non-contributor. In this
allocation, individual public good contributions are z^1 ¼ 0, z^2 ¼ w2  x^2 ¼ 2  53 ¼ 13, and
z^3 ¼ w3  x^3 ¼ 3  53 ¼ 43.
To confirm that this allocation is indeed the NE, we have to check the three conditions
listed in Sect. 2: Clearly, z^1 þ z^2 þ z^3 ¼ 0 þ 13 þ 43 ¼ 53 ¼ G^, which gives condition (1).
Condition (2) holds for the contributing agents, i = 2, 3, since eðG^; aiÞ ¼ G^ ¼ 53 ¼ x^i.
Condition (3) follows insofar as G1ð1; 1Þ ¼ w1 ¼ 1, G2ð2; 1Þ ¼ w2 ¼ 2, and
G3ð3; 1Þ ¼ w3 ¼ 3, so that G1ð1; 1Þ\G^\ G2ð2; 1Þ\ G3ð3; 1Þ:
In this representation of Olson’s classical exploitation hypothesis, agent 1, with the
lowest income, does not contribute to the public good in the NE. Among the two con-
tributors, higher-income agent 3 makes a larger contribution than agent 2 to the public
good and, thus, is ‘‘exploited.’’
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Case 2 wi = w = 1 and ai = a = 1 for i = 1, 2, 3, while a1 ¼ 12, a2 ¼ 34, and a3 = 1;
i.e., the otherwise equal agents are ranked w.r.t. their preference intensity for the public
good.
The three conditions that characterize the NE are fulfilled at x^1 ¼ 1, x^2 ¼ 45, and
x^3 ¼ G^ ¼ 35, where the individual public good contributions are z^1 ¼ 0, z^2 ¼ 15, and z^3 ¼ 25,







¼ x^2 and e3ðG^; 1Þ ¼ G^a3 ¼ 1  35 ¼ 35 ¼ x^3. Given that G1ð1; 1Þ ¼ a1 ¼ 12,
G2ð1; 1Þ ¼ a2 ¼ 34, and G3ð1; 1Þ ¼ a3 ¼ 1 for these preferences, condition (3) also is
satisfied.
Agent 1, with the smallest preference for the public good, is a complete free rider.
Among the two contributors, agent 3 with the strongest public good preference contributes
more to this good and, thus, is ‘‘exploited’’ by agent 2, who possesses a smaller public good
preference.
Case 3 wi = ai = 1 for i = 1, 2, 3, and a1 ¼ 14, a2 ¼ 13, and a3 ¼ 12.
Now, the NE corresponds to x^1 ¼ 1, x^2 ¼ 56, x^3 ¼ 59, and G^ ¼ 518, for which individual
public good contributions, as measured in the units of the private good, are z^1 ¼ 0, z^2 ¼ 16,
and z^3 ¼ 49. For this allocation, we have: a1z^1 þ a2z^2 þ a3z^3 ¼ 14  0 þ 13  16 þ 12  49 ¼
5
18
¼ G^, which gives condition (1). Condition (2) follows since e2ðG^; 13Þ ¼ 3  518 ¼ 56 ¼ x^2
and e3ðG^; 1Þ ¼ 2  518 ¼ 59 ¼ x^3. Condition (3) is satisfied because G3ð1; 12Þ ¼ a3 ¼
1
2
[ G2ð1; 13Þ ¼ a2 ¼ 13 [ G^ ¼ 518, while G1ð1; 14Þ ¼ a1 ¼ 14\ 518 ¼ G^:
In this example, the most productive agent, agent 3, spends more of her income on the
public good and, thus, is ‘‘exploited’’ by agents 1 and 2. Least-productive agent 1 con-
tributes nothing to the public good.
4.2 Interaction of the partial effects
The partial effects that underlie the above three cases may interact and oppose each other.
Either because of weak preferences for the public good or a low public good productivity,
it is possible that an agent (e.g., a country) with a relatively high income contributes less to
the public good than a poorer one and even may become a complete free rider. The
interaction of the different partial effects can be visualized by the following examples, in
which we again consider an economy with three agents, who all possess Cobb–Douglas
preferences, uiðxi;GÞ ¼ xiGai , and whose income levels are w1 = 1, w2 = 2, and w3 = 3.
In the first example, we assume that the three agents have the same public good
productivity ai = 1, but display different preferences: i.e., a1 = 1, a2 ¼ 13, and a3 ¼ 16, so
that agent 1 has the smallest income but the strongest preference for the public good, while
agent 3 has the largest income but the weakest preference for the public good. In this
situation, the NE is given by x^1 ¼ G^ ¼ 35, x^2 ¼ 95, and x^3 ¼ 3, which, as before, is confirmed
by checking the three conditions that characterize a NE.1 The individual public good
contributions thus are z^1 ¼ 25, z^2 ¼ 15, and z^3 ¼ 0, so that the ranking of public good con-
tributions is reversed from that of the standard exploitation hypothesis. Owing to a strong
1 The details of the proofs for this subsection can be obtained from the authors upon request.
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public good preference, the poorest agent pays the most for the public good, while the
richest agent, who values the public good the least, contributes nothing.
In the second example, the three agents have the same Cobb–Douglas preference with
ai = 1, but display different public good productivities, for which a1 = 1, a2 ¼ 13, and
a3 ¼ 16, so that agent 1 with the smallest income has the largest productivity, while agent 3
with the largest income has the smallest productivity. The NE then is given by x^1 ¼ G^ ¼ 59,
x^2 ¼ 53, and x^3 ¼ 3, so that the individual public good contributions are z^1 ¼ 49, z^2 ¼ 16, and
z^3 ¼ 0. Now, the poorest, but most productive, agent spends the most for the public good,
whereas the richest, but least productive, agent takes a free ride.
These two examples show how the conventional exploitation effect may be counter-
balanced by the effects that underlie the other two versions of the exploitation maxim,
presented in this paper.
5 Some empirical applications
To highlight the relevancy of the three exploitation hypotheses, we provide some illus-
trations drawn from international public goods.
Before presenting these illustrations, we must review how the literature goes from the
individual provision of public goods to the country provision of an international public
good. Generally speaking, the literature treats the country as a unitary actor with the other
contributors being countries, each of which likewise is a unitary actor (see, e.g., Boadway
and Hayashi 1999; Buchholz et al. 2014; Cornes and Sandler 1996; Ihori 1996; Murdoch
and Sandler 1997). As such, gross domestic product (GDP) replaces income in the budget
constraint, which already had been a central assumption in Olson and Zeckhauser’s (1966)
seminal NATO burden-sharing study. Consistent with our paper, their underlying model is




ðxi;GÞ, to the reciprocal of the per unit price of defense since the
private good’s price is normalized to 1. This approach has been taken by the literature
because the capacity of a country to provide defense is better captured by its productive
capacity, represented by total GDP, rather than by its average income per capita or well-
being.2 Henceforth, we use GDP, and not per capita income, as the income measure to
denote ‘‘rich,’’ since this is the one that is primarily used by the standard literature’s notion
of exploitation for international public goods. For many international public goods, GDP
rather than average per capita income better measures the capacity of the country to
provide the good.
The first application of the classical exploitation hypothesis was to the NATO alliance,
in which—despite the member states’ commitment to mutual assistance—allies voluntarily
contribute to collective defense. Defense spending that deters an enemy’s attack on the
allies constitutes the voluntary provision of a pure public good. With respect to burden
sharing within the NATO, Olson and Zeckhauser (1966) hypothesized that rich allies
2 For contributing and non-contributing countries, Boadway and Hayashi (1999) explored the effects of
population differences on exploitation with respect to an international public good. The standard
exploitation hypothesis, based on GDP, carries over to per capita income provided that population is the
same among countries. If, however, population differs among countries, Boadway and Hayashi (1999,
p. 624) showed that more populous contributing countries consume less of the private good and are worse
off than less populous countries regardless of per capita income. Moreover, non-contributing countries are
better off if their per capita income is larger.
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would shoulder more of the alliance’s deterrence burdens than the ‘‘poor’’ allies, where
GDP served as the income proxy. To test this exploitation hypothesis, they used the allies’
military expenditures (MEs) as shares of GDP as the burden measure. The ME/GDP ratio
indicates an ally’s relative defense contribution in terms of its productive capacity, which
is not the case for an analogous ratio based on per capita income. Using a Spearman rank
correlation test, Olson and Zeckhauser (1966) found a significant positive relationship for
1964 between the allies’ ME/GDP ranks and their GDP ranks, thus supporting the income-
or GDP-based exploitation hypothesis in case 1, where the countries with the larger GDPs
shoulder a relatively greater defense burden.
In more recent times, Greece and Turkey spend a greater proportion of their GDP on
defense than do many of their richer (higher-GDP) allies in NATO (Sandler and Murdoch
2000). For example, in 2000, Greece and Turkey devoted 3.6 and 3.7 % of their GDPs to
military expenditure, respectively, while, e.g., the United Kingdom spent 2.4 % and
Germany only 1.5 % of their GDP on ME (SIPRI 2015), which reflects different culturally
and historically determined attitudes concerning military activities. In the Greek-Turkish
case, traditional grievances between these two countries raised their preferences for
defense and motivated their greater burdens compared to their much richer NATO allies.
Even though the ME/GDP ratios of these two countries have fallen since then, they are still
higher than for most other NATO members (Sandler and George 2016).
In this way, the Greek-Turkish case can be justified by a joint product defense model, in
which defense spending gives rise to a country-specific defense benefit and alliance-wide
deterrence (Cornes and Sandler 1984; Sandler and Hartley 2001). In this case, the ally’s
basic utility function remains ui(xi, G), but in addition there is a private gain from its
defense expenditure and thus from its public good contribution. At a NE, an ally equates its
weighted sum of marginal rates of substitution from the jointly produced public and private
defense outputs to the reciprocal of the price of G. Allies with greater private gains from
defense have, ceteris paribus, a greater willingness to contribute to the public good. This
has been described as an important subcase of case 2 in Sect. 3 above. For now,
remarkably, the ME/GDP ratio also is larger for some new NATO members in Eastern
Europe, which perceive a stronger foreign threat for historical reasons. According to the
World Bank, this ratio has been 1.9 % in Estonia and Poland, and 2.7 % in Lithuania in
2014. Ceteris paribus, larger private defense gains induce an ally to shoulder a larger
military expenditure burden in terms of its GDP.
Also for the permanent Western members of the UN Security Council (United States,
United Kingdom, and France), ME/GDP are relatively high because these countries have a
long-standing tradition of feeling responsible for global security far beyond their own
borders and those of their allies. For these new allies and for the UN Security Council
members, preferences for defense are stronger than for other members, thereby inducing
them to shoulder a larger ME/GDP burden, which reflects the alternative interpretations of
the preference-related mechanism of case 2.
To illustrate case 2 and also case 3 further, we consider the US-Israeli alliance using
data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) (2015). Even
though Israel has a much smaller GDP than the United States, Israel’s ME/GDP exceeded
that of the United States as follows: 23 % compared to 7.7 % in 1970, 13.7 % compared to
5.3 % in 1990, and 5.2 % compared to 3.5 % in 2014 (SIPRI 2015). Obviously, Israel has a
much stronger preference for defense in the Middle East, insofar as it is surrounded by
enemy states, all of which have fought wars with Israel. Moreover, the productivity of
Israel in defending itself in the region exceeds that of the United States, which must project
its power to the Middle East. In addition, Israel has adapted its weapon systems, even those
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purchased from the United States, to be better suited to the desert battlefields surrounding
Israel. Thus, case 3 also comes into play.
Other potential examples exist showing that the mechanisms, which underlie our cases 2
and 3, counteract the classical exploitation hypothesis. Consider peacekeeping as a pure
public good that brings stability to the world. In 2000 among NATO allies, Denmark
devoted the largest share of its GDP to UN and non-UN-led peacekeeping missions, even
though its GDP ranked 13th of the 18 allies (Shimizu and Sandler 2003). The other three
highest ranked contributors in 2000 were the Netherlands, Italy, and Norway. Clearly,
some smaller-GDP allies—mainly because of specific political attitudes and power rela-
tions within these countries—displayed a greater preference for underwriting peacekeep-
ing. Denmark and Norway view peacekeeping as a more desirable public good than do
some other NATO allies. Among NATO allies, there is no evidence that some countries’
soldiers are better trained at peacekeeping than others, so that case 3 is not germane.
Another field of application of our theoretical results is foreign aid, which is a public
good providing nonexcludable and nonrival benefits to countries that care about less for-
tunate countries. Given Sweden’s, Denmark’s, and Norway’s stated commitment to foreign
aid, they provide a much larger share of their GDP to helping poor countries than higher-
GDP countries, such as the United States (Sandler 2004), so that more than an income
effect can be at work. Scandinavia’s relatively large contributions to foreign aid are
attributable to some specific sense of moral obligation and, hence, abide by case 2.
Addressing cross-border pollution can also represent cases 2 and 3. In regards to
switching from ozone-shield-depleting substances, advanced countries, such as the United
States, Japan, and many EU countries, had the advantage over other countries. A pro-
ductivity edge came from being able to more quickly substitute for ozone-depleting sub-
stances with more ozone-benign substitutes (Murdoch and Sandler 1997; Peinhardt and
Sandler 2015). This advantage was so great that, consistent with our case 2, the Montreal
Protocol not only required greater abatement efforts from these rich countries, but also
their underwriting of a Multilateral Fund to assist less capable countries to abide by the
treaty (Sandler 2004). Productivity differences with respect to the reduction of sulfur
emissions also meant that the Oslo Protocol required larger percentage cutbacks from those
countries with a greater productivity in mitigation measures (Finus and Tjøtta 2003). Both
of these examples result in an exploitation of the more productive country for the bet-
terment of everyone in ratified international environmental agreements. In this context, we
note that these agreements are considered to be mere manifestations of abatement efforts
that countries would have undertaken on a voluntary basis (Murdoch and Sandler 1997).
By virtue of a sense of environmental morality (a relatively strong position of the Green
Party in its political system), Germany has been more ambitious in its greenhouse gas
mitigation efforts than the United States despite German GDP being lower. This outcome
reflects case 2. Germany’s strong preference for climate protection particularly shows up in
its enormous subsidies for renewable energies, which totaled about 24 billion Euros in
2015.
As in case 3, productivity differences also characterize efforts to reduce climate change
through a smaller carbon footprint. High-abatement-cost countries typically are reluctant to
become active in climate policy. For example, this is the case for countries (such as India,
China, and, among the European countries, especially Poland), whose electricity supply
heavily depends on the use of coal, which is abundant at low cost so that the opportunity
costs of turning to a climate-friendlier energy supply would be high. These carbon-de-
pendent countries have an energy infrastructure that is fossil-fuel oriented, so that to reduce
their dependency on these fuels would require tremendous switchover costs. Moreover, as
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seen from the supply-side perspective on climate policy (Sinn 2012), such a switchover
also would imply the abandonment of huge resource rents in coal-rich countries.
Of course, some abatement can initially be achieved relatively cheaply through greater
efficiency also in carbon-dependent countries, but these abatement costs will rise steeply
once these efficiency gains are exhausted and an alternative energy pathway is needed to
make steeper carbon cuts. Such a new pathway would be needed for far-reaching decar-
bonization and the associated deep structural change in energy supply, based either on
renewables or nuclear energy or a combination of both. That abatement costs may affect a
country’s contribution to global climate protection is also corroborated by the recent
experience in the United States: Progress in fracking technology and falling costs of shale
gas production made it possible to substitute less carbon-intensive natural gas for dirty
coal. This is considered to be a major cause for the reduction in greenhouse gas emissions
in the United States, which fell by 9 % between 2005 and 2013 (Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) 2015).
Moreover, some countries have a productivity advantage in terms of the use of
renewable energy sources. In the United States, Texas, Hawaii, and Wyoming have an
advantage over many other states in the production of wind power owing to wind patterns,
while coastal states will have an advantage in wave-produced power as the technology is
further developed. Sun-drenched states, such as Arizona, Nevada, and Texas potentially
have an advantage in the production of solar energy. In Europe, e.g., Denmark and
Northern Germany have an advantage in wind power, whereas the southern European
countries (such as Spain, Italy, and Greece) enjoy lower costs in generating solar energy.
One might expect that these comparative advantages will foster contributions to the global
public good of climate protection. Moreover, country-specific ancillary benefits of
greenhouse gas abatement will also increase a country’s willingness to carry out corre-
sponding measures (Finus and Ru¨bbelke 2013), which also is captured by case 2.
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